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MATERIAL PERSONS, IMMATERIAL SOULS 
AND AN ETHIC OF LIFE 
Kevin Corcoran 
Among objections to naturalist views of human persons like Animalism 
and the Constitution View are two that concern alleged ethical implications. 
One criticism is that such views are defective because they lack the meta-
physical resources to generate moral obligations or moral expectations to 
protect life, in either its early or late stages. Another objection relies on the 
claim that any metaphysical view of human persons according to which 
some human organisms lack the property of personhood has horrendous 
moral implications. With respect to the first objection I argue that resources 
metaphysically neutral with respect to dualism and naturalism about per-
sons must be added to such views in order to generate moral obligations or 
moral expectations to protect human life. In other words, dualism about 
persons, no less than naturalism, fails to provide metaphysical resources 
necessary or sufficient for generating moral obligations or moral expecta-
tions to protect the life of a human fetus or PVS patient. And against the 
second objection I argue that accounts of human persons entailing that 
some human organisms are not also persons do not have the horrible ethi-
cal implications they are alleged to have. I then consider and respond to 
several possible objections to my arguments. 
According to the Constitution View of human persons, human persons are 
essentially physical and essentially psychological,1 One implication of the 
Constitution View (CV) is that no early term fetus constitutes a person. 
Another implication is that any entity once possessing but having lost all 
capacity for the relevant kinds of psychological states, also fails to consti-
tute a person; and, therefore, some human organisms in so-called "persis-
tent vegetative states" (PVS) no longer constitute persons. According to 
animalism, on the other hand, human persons are essentially animals, and 
only contingently persons. In fact, according to animalism, you and I were 
once human, non-persons as fetuses and, if things should go badly for us, 
we may one day be human, non-persons again, e.g., if we should ever be 
PVS patients with completely destroyed cerebra.2 
Among the objections to naturalist views3 of human persons like ani-
malism and the Constitution View are two that concern alleged ethical 
implications. The two objections I have in mind, however, are seldom dis-
tinguished. One is that such views are defective because they lack the 
metaphysical resources to generate moral obligations or moral expecta-
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tions to protect life, in either its early or late stages. In other words, there is 
a positive moral implication we want a metaphysical view of persons to 
have and views like animalism and the CV lack it. Another objection relies 
on the claim that our metaphysical view of human persons is decisive for 
"virtually every debated issue in biomedical ethics today"4 and that any 
view according to which some human organisms lack the property of per-
sonhood has horrendous moral implications. Put another way, the positive 
moral implications animalism and the CV do have are horrible. In this 
paper I acknowledge that naturalist views of human persons like animal-
ism and CV fail to provide metaphysical resources necessary or sufficient 
for generating moral obligations or moral expectations to protect the life of 
a human fetus or PVS patient. I point out, however, that any metaphysical 
view of persons, be that metaphysic dualist or naturalist in nature, is impo-
tent to provide such resources. I argue that other resources, metaphysical-
ly neutral with respect to dualism and naturalism, must be added to such 
views in order to generate moral obligations or moral expectations to pro-
tect human life. Moreover, I think it can be shown that accounts of human 
persons entailing that some human organisms are not also persons do not 
have the horrible ethical implications they are alleged to have. I will argue 
then for the following three claims: (i) neither metaphysical dualism nor 
metaphysical naturalism about persons all by itself entails or precludes an 
ethic of life; (ii) metaphysical views of human persons entailing that some 
human organisms are not also persons are perfectly compatible with the 
belief that abortion, some varieties of euthanasia, etc. are morally wrong; 
and finally (iii) dualism is compatible with, and on some versions even 
entails, the claim that abortion never ends the existence of a human person. 
I. The Charge Against Naturalists 
The most recent and explicit statement of the objection that one's meta-
physics of persons is decisive for the ethical issues of, inter alia, abortion 
and euthanasia, appears in J.P. Moreland's and Scott Rae's Body and Soul. 
Moreland and Rae argue not only for "the relevance of our philosophical 
reflections on human personhood to many of the most intensely debated 
moral issues of the day,"S but they also want to "point out the ethical 
implications of our philosophical view of a human person."6 Moreland 
and Rae hold that "metaphysics and morality are intimately connected".7 
They want to argue that the philosophical naturalist account of persons, 
and what they call the "Christian Complementarian" account of persons, 
have "serious, troublesome implications for the ethical issues [of abortion, 
fetal research, cloning and physician assisted suicide]".' They seem to 
believe that only a substance dualist view of human persons can deliver 
the needed resources for a viable ethic of life. Any view of human persons 
according to which some human organisms are not also persons "opens 
the door" to the mistreatment of those at the edges of life, both fetuses and 
patients in persistent vegetative states.9 
The argument for this claim is supposed to be delivered in chapter 3 of 
Body and Soul. The argument appears to be as follows: 
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1. According to naturalist conceptions of persons, human person-
hood is grounded in the possession of certain kinds of psycho-
logical properties or the capacity for them. 
2. If human personhood is grounded in possession of psychologi-
cal properties or capacities for them, then some human organ-
isms fail to instantiate the property of being a person. 
3. If some human organism fails to instantiate the property of 
being a person, then that organism lacks a moral status suffi-
cient for generating moral obligations or moral expectations to 
protect its life. 
:.4. On Naturalist conceptions of persons some human organisms 
(e.g. early term human fetuses) fail to instantiate the property of 
being a person. 
:.5. On Naturalist conceptions of persons some human organisms 
lack a moral status sufficient for generating moral obligations or 
moral expectations to protect their lives. 
It is, I believe, on the basis of such a conclusion as (5) that one might be 
erroneously led to conclude that naturalist conceptions of persons have the 
following troublesome implication, call it 
6. We have no moral obligations or responsibilities with respect to 
non-person constituting human organisms. 
The argument to 5 is obviously valid. Although questions can be raised 
about other premises, I want to focus in this paper on premise 3. What 
Moreland and Rae must do is give good reasons for accepting 3. They 
don't. They fail to establish a connection between a so-called naturalist con-
ception of persons and the morality of abortion, some varieties of euthana-
sia, fetal research and human cloning. What they do in chapter 3 of Body 
and Soul is first assert that such a connection exists, go on to describe the 
metaphysics of naturalism as it relates to persons, and then reassert the 
connection at the end of the chapter. But nowhere in the chapter or else-
where in the book is the alleged connection established.lO 
For Moreland and Rae it is a commitment to metaphysical dualism that 
drives the view that a metaphysiCS of persons is decisive for the ethical 
issues under discussion. Indeed I think we can capture the intuition at the 
root of Moreland's and Rae's argument in terms of a necessary condition 
for grounding our obligations to the unborn and other vulnerable human 
lives. Call it N. 
N: A necessary condition for grounding our obligations to the 
unborn and other vulnerable human lives is a commitment to 
persons as immaterial, substantial souls.ll 
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Supplementing N with 
S: Naturalist conceptions of personhood assume the denial of 
immaterial, substantial souls. 
delivers what admittedly would be, if true, a defect in naturalist concep-
tions of persons, namely, 
0: Naturalist conceptions of personhood are incompatible with 
our having obligations to the unborn and other vulnerable 
human lives. 
The idea that N attempts to capture is, I think, that there is a very tight con-
nection between personhood and moral status such that anything lacking 
personhood lacks a moral status sufficient to guarantee a prohibition against 
its killing. Given that intuition, and accepting N and S, seems to commit natu-
ralists to the view that we have no moral obligations or responsibilities with 
respect to protecting the life of non-person constituting human organisms. 
The problem, however, is that although the move to 0 from N and S is 
valid N is neither intuitively known nor self-evidently true. Not only is it 
not obviously true, it is, I believe, demonstrably false. Indeed I want to 
show that not only is dualism not necessary for generating obligations and 
responsibilities to fetuses and PVS patients, it is, in fact, compatible with 
the belief that no abortion ends the existence of a human person. 
II. Metaphysical Insufficiency 
If I am correct, then there is at the root of Moreland's and Rae's argu-
ment the intuition that a necessary condition for grounding our obligations 
to the unborn and other vulnerable human lives is the fact that persons are 
immaterial, substantial souls. If that inhlition is true, then the following 
couplet of claims would be in some important sense incompatible: 
(i) Human persons are necessarily, wholly material things 
(ii) Abortion, some varieties of euthanasia, etc. are morally wrong 
It seems prima facie obvious, however, that naturalists can be committed to 
the moral irnpermissiblity of abortion. This "seeming" does not itself estab-
lish the compatibility of the couplet of claims above, but it does I think sug-
gest that metaphysical dualism about persons is not essential for generating a 
moral obligation or moral expectation to protect human life. For ease of dis-
cussion I will simply refer to the moral obligation or moral expectation to 
protect human life as constituting an ethic of life. So to see how a metaphysics 
of naturalism is compatible with an ethic of life consider the following. 
Suppose human persons are human organisms with developed capaci-
ties for the rich sort of psychological life normally associated with paradigm 
instances of adult human beings; i.e., suppose human persons are necessarily 
psychological beings. If so, then no early term human fetus is a person. 
Surely, however, one with such a view of human persons as just described 
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could quite coherently protest the abortion of an early term fetus on the 
grounds that a) it is prima facie morally wrong to destroy a person in potentia 
and a normal human fetus is just such a being or b) even if the fetus is 
defective and does not even qualify as a potential person, it is still a member 
of the human community and to terminate the existence of a member of the 
community would diminish the kind of bond essential to the preservation 
and health of the community.12 
Notice that in each of the reasons just now offered for prohibiting the 
abortion of the early term fetus the metaphysics of persons was supple-
mented with moral principles in order to yield the moral conclusion. I 
suggest that this is not just a fact about metaphysical naturalism or the 
particular reasons chosen, but a fact about the insufficiency of any meta-
physics of persons all by itself to ground an ethic of life. I should hasten 
to point out, also, that each of the reasons offered is eminently plausible 
as a prima facie justification for prohibiting the destruction of a human, 
non-person. 
Consider now the claim that human persons are at least partially com-
posed of immaterial souls, which are connected as intimately as you like 
to human organisms. On all such dualist views currently on offer by 
Christian philosophers, be that dualism of the Cartesian variety or of the 
Thomistic variety advocated by Moreland and Rae, be it emergent dual-
ism or creationist dualism, on all such views it is metaphysically possible 
for the soul both to a) continue in existence after the demise of the organ-
ism it animates and b) carry with it the identity of the person. On such 
views, therefore, abortion ends the life of an object that is such that if it 
ceases to exist no person will cease to exist as a result. For this reason it is 
not only plausible to think that abortion never ends the existence of a per-
son, but it in fact is an entailment of Moreland's and Rae's own brand of 
dualism. And if an abortion never ends the existence of a person, then, 
for dualists, any prohibition against abortion cannot be because it 
destroys a person.13 
On such a view as Moreland's and Rae's one can still oppose abortion, 
of course. One might, for example, offer the following as support for a 
prohibition against abortion: God intends every human person to be a 
soul-body composite, and abortion is the wrenching apart of what God 
intends to be joined. Notice, however, the metaphysics of dualism does 
not alone support the moral conclusion that the life of a human fetus 
ought to be protected. Instead, it is appeal to God's intentions that, cou-
pled with the metaphysics, supports the prohibition. But such a consid-
eration as this is no less congenial to naturalist views of persons, as I shall 
soon suggest. I believe that our discussion so far is sufficient to demon-
strate that neither a metaphysics of dualism nor a metaphysics of natural-
ism about persons alone settles the moral issues at stake by either entail-
ing or precluding an ethic of life. I conclude, therefore, that although it is 
true that naturalist views of persons lack the metaphysical resources 
either necessary or sufficient to generate moral obligations or moral 
expectations to prohibit the taking of human life, this is also true of dual-
ist views of persons. 
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III. Objections and Replies 
Objection: It might be objected that naturalist views of persons are not 
all on a par, and that even if some versions of naturalism do not have hor-
rendous moral implications, it is not the case all do not. For example, con-
sider animalism. According to animalists, although every human person 
was once an early term human fetus, no early term human fetus is a 
human person. Therefore, every human person once was, and may be 
again, a human, non-person. Yet granting the moral principle that" a wrong 
making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its 
future"14, it follows that aborting human but non-personal fetuses would 
be prima facie seriously morally wrong. It would be wrong because to 
abort them would be to deprive them of valuable futures, namely, futures 
just like ours.15 
But now consider the Constitution View of human persons. It seems to 
be handicapped in ways animalism is not. For according to defenders of 
the Constitution View, human persons are not identical with human ani-
mals.16 Therefore, it appears as though defenders of the CV cannot avail 
themselves of a moral principle like" a wrong making feature of a killing is 
the loss to the victim of the value of its future". They cannot avail them-
selves of a principle like this, it might be argued, since on the CV none of 
us human persons is, was, or ever will be, numerically identical with a 
human animal, including human fetuses. Since no human fetus is, was, or 
ever will be, identical with a human person, killing a human fetus will not 
deprive the fetus of a personal future. So it might be objected that the CV 
in particular is without the resources to ground a plausible ethic of life.17 
Reply: Not surprisingly, I disagree that defenders of the CV are with-
out the resources to ground a plausible ethic of life. First, we are not in the 
ordinary business of life given to distinguishing the "is" of identity from 
the "is" of constitution. Am I a human animal? Was I ever a human fetus? 
Well, defenders of the CV say "yes" to both, in the sense that I am now 
constituted by a human animal that once was a fetus." Defenders of the 
CV, therefore, can employ some of the same kind of moral principles as 
their animalist relatives in order to generate prohibitions against abortion. 
For example, because a normal human fetus "is" a person in potentia, in the 
sense that it will come to constitute a person if left to develop in the ordinary 
way, the life of a human fetus ought to be protected. In the same way, even 
if the fetus is defective and does not even qualify as a potential person, in 
the sense that there is no likelihood that it will come to constitute a person, 
it is still a member of the biologically human community and to terminate 
the existence of a member of the that community would diminish the kind 
of bond essential to the preservation and health of the morally human com-
munity. Moreover, I have argued elsewhere that every human fetus is cre-
ated by God with the ultimate intention of coming to constitute a person 
and on the basis of God's ultimately good intentions for it the life of the 
fetus ought to be protected.19 The same holds for human organisms in per-
sistent vegetative states. It is plausible to believe that God intends every 
human organism to constitute a person, and in view of this there is a prima 
facie obligation not to kill a PVS patient. So even defenders of views like 
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the CV are not without the moral and theological resources to argue for the 
moral wrongness of abortion, some varieties of euthanasia, etc. 
Objection: On the face of it, it looks as though a prohibition against 
killing a fetus would be because doing so would prevent it from coming to 
constitute a person, or in the case of human organisms in persistent vegeta-
tive states, coming again to constitute a person, thus pre-empting God's 
intentions for the human organism.20 However, based on a plausible princi-
ple of persistence for human bodies I have argued elsewhere for the possi-
bility of human bodies persisting through death, or their being resurrected 
some time after death.21 But if God will see to it that fetal bodies and the 
bodies of PVS patients will not go out of existence, but persist through 
their deaths, or go out of existence only temporarily (only to be resurrected 
by God at some time in the future), the prohibition cannot owe to pre-
empting God's intentions. For if what I have argued elsewhere is correct, 
those intentions will be fulfilled, if not before death, then after. 
Reply: Whether God intervenes to resurrect our bodies or to see them 
remain intact through death, neither of these gracious acts in any way 
diminishes our obligation not to kill. First consider an analogy for resur-
rection. It would be wrong for my son to attempt to destroy the table I 
made even though, let us suppose, it is true that I could and would restore 
the table. It would be wrong for my son to take actions purposefully 
intended to destroy the table because aside from a flagrant act of disrespect 
it would, if successful, temporarily thwart the aims and intentions I had as 
its creator. That is, it would cause the table to cease to exist; if not forever, 
then at least for a time. So too with acts of killing human organisms. 
Although God can and will raise human bodies from the dead, killing 
them would be at cross purposes with God's aims. 
Consider now the case of immediate survival. If our bodies can survive 
death it is still plausible to believe that we have an obligation not to under-
take actions which, save for the gracious intervention of God, would kill a 
human organism, since our undertaking such actions would be at cross 
purposes with God's intentions for natural, biological human life, i.e., they 
would, save for the gracious intervention of God, destroy what is neces-
sary for human personhood, the end for which God creates human, biolog-
icallife. So even if one is a naturalist who believes as I do that though we 
die yet shall we live, either in virtue of being resurrected or persisting 
through death, there are still plausible reasons for why there is a prima facie 
obligation not to kill. 
IV. Moral Responsibility and Entia Successiva 
There are two final issues that need to be addressed. First, it might be 
argued that there are broadly moral considerations that do seem to favor 
some form of a dualist metaphYSics of persons over naturalist views. For 
example, suppose all complex material objects such as tables, ships and 
physical organisms are entia successiva, in Chisholm's sense of being succes-
sions of related objects, but not strictly and philosophically speaking, entia 
per se, i.e., genuine objects in their own right. And suppose further mereo-
logical essentialism is true such that all entia successiva are relatively short-
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lived entities owing to their composition out of aggregates of different parts 
at different times. Since the bearers of moral responsibility for past actions 
must persist for an appreciable length of time it seems no human person is 
identical with an ens successivum. If there are human persons i.e., responsible 
agents, they must be entia per se, as entia per se are the only sort of thing that, 
strictly and philosophically speaking, endure through time. But the only 
candidate for an ens per se with which to identify a person is an immaterial 
and partless soul. So there must be immaterial souls if there are persons.22 
There are two points to make in reply to this sort of moral consideration 
in favor of dualism. First, even if the metaphysics is true it doesn't follow 
that an immaterial soul is the only candidate for a human person. 
Chisholm's own position at one time, it will be recalled, was that we 
human persons are tiny physical objects, housed in human brains, objects 
that neither gain nor lose parts during the course of their existence.23 So if 
Chisholm was right, then it is false that if there are persons they must be 
immaterial and partless souls. More important, however, if mereological 
essentialism is true and immaterial souls are the only candidates for endur-
ing entities capable of possessing agency and responsibility, then although 
naturalism might entail that there are no persons or agents at all the moral 
question as to whether vulnerable human lives ought to be protected 
remains an open question. The question is not settled by metaphysics 
alone. After all, from the fact that no canines are persons it does not follow 
that we have no obligations with respect to how we treat them. 
v. On The Word 'Person' 
This brings me to the final issue I want to consider.24 I have been using 
the term 'person' in the sense of "individual with a capacity for certain 
kinds of psychological states". There are, however, different senses of the 
term 'person'. Suppose instead of using the term in the sense of "individual 
with the capacity for certain kinds of psycholOgical states" we use the term 
in the moral sense of "an entity deserving protection under an ethic of life," 
i.e., an entity possessing inherent value. Now if we embrace a thesis like 
MB: Only human persons are moral beings (i.e., entities deserving 
protection by virtue of possessing inherent value) 
it might be thought that we can grant that while we may have obligations 
toward non-persons our obligations toward moral persons differ in impor-
tant respects from our obligations toward non-persons. For example, 
obligations toward moral persons are correlated with moral rights and in 
virtue of this we might think that our obligations toward persons are 
weightier than those toward non-persons. If Moreland and Rae are com-
mitted to something like MB, then they are right to think that views like 
animalism and CV, which deny human personhood to human fetuses and 
PVS patients, cannot generate moral obligations that carry anything near 
the same weight as those generated by views that do count human fetuses 
and PVS patients as persons. 
There are several ways to respond to this. First, I believe a virtue of 
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grounding value in something like God's ultimately good intentions for 
God's creation is that one need tell only one story that obligates us to pro-
tect the life of created, living things whereas a view like Moreland's and 
Rae's must tell two stories; one of them yielding obligations to persons and 
another yielding obligations to non-persons. Second, a single story 
grounding value in theistic intentions is compatible with there being differ-
ent degrees of moral weightiness. Our obligations toward moral persons 
might be weightier than our obligations toward non-persons based on 
God's intentions for each kind. But it is plausible to believe that our obliga-
tions toward human non-persons are, for the same reason, weightier than 
our obligations to non-human, non-persons. For example, because God 
intends every human organism to constitute a human person, and human 
persons have a privileged role in God's economy, our obligation to human 
fetuses and PVS patients is weightier than our obligation to non-human 
entities, so much so as to prima facie prohibit the killing of either the human 
fetus or the PVS patient. I believe, therefore, that naturalist views of 
human persons like animalism and CV can grant MB without there follow-
ing any dire ethical consequences. 
Conclusion 
I have been arguing against the claim that one's metaphysicS of persons 
alone is decisive for an ethic of life. I have contended that neither a meta-
physics of dualism nor a metaphYSiCS of naturalism about persons alone 
either entails or precludes an ethic of life. I have also argued that views 
according to which some human organisms are not also persons are com-
patible with the belief that it is morally impermissible to kill human, non-
persons. Where it might appear that a particular metaphysics of persons 
alone and all by itself entails a particular moral conclusion (be that conclu-
sion for or against life) it is instead other claims supplemental to it and con-
joined with it that lead to the conclusion. That in itself may not seem all 
that interesting, since we know that an "ought" cannot be wrung from an 
"is". What is more interesting is what I hope also to have established; 
namely, that a robust ethic of life is no less congenial to a metaphysics of 
naturalism about human persons than it is to a metaphysics of dualism 
about human persons. In fact, I hope to have shown even more than that. 
I hope to have shown that when it comes to dualism and ethics at the begin-
ning and end of life, things are not nearly as straightforward as some dual-
ists are inclined to think.25 
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